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Abstract 
The proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has led to massive generation of sensor data and increase in 
attack vectors. Traffic generated by these devices require more exploratory studies in order to determine the 
effective ways to secure transmitted data and avert exploitation by hackers. IoT devices susceptibility to direct or 
remote manipulation, secure channel used for message transmission and resilience of the underlying middleware 
(broker) to exploitation are very important issues that worth consideration. With more data ever being collected 
than before, the security of user’s information and devices identities are becoming a great concern. In this research 
work, we evaluate the vulnerabilities inherent in an IoT ecosystem design that was developed using Raspberry Pi, 
sensors and MQTT protocol. We also developed a real-time anomaly detection in sensor reading to avert dangerous 
situation and evaluate the effectiveness of our work. 
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1. Introduction  
The current era of Internet of Things (IoT) has led to the development of many IoT devices and their adoption into 
various aspect of industries, institutions and the society at large. The emergence of smart cars, smart fridge, smart 
locks, smart plug to mention a few are evidence of the proliferation of IoT. Sensors will arguably play a major role 
in the IoT ecosystem for interacting with the physical entities and transmission of data, both digital and analog 
sensor data. With the massive sensor data that are being generated, the security and reliability of IoT ecosystem is 
of utmost importance. Users are not fully convinced and still skeptical about the security of their information. 
Many recent cyber attacks and exploitation of vulnerabilities in connected devices have heighten user’s concerns. 
Inherent vulnerabilities in devices like outdated firmware, unencrypted data transmission and insecure 
communication channels can easily be exploited to compromise the security of IoT devices. It has been discovered 
that many manufacturers of IoT devices do not often consider robust security mechanism during the design phase 
and implementation process. The size and resource-constrained nature of IoT devices are some of the major factors 
that has been identified which limit the integration of such security mechanism. Lightweight communication 
protocols and cryptographic algorithms have been suggested as a viable solution to improve the security of IoT 
devices. 
Moreover, ubiquitous data generated by IoT devices have increased the means and attack vectors that enable 
hackers to exploit device vulnerabilities. Security flaws in network access points, routers and gateways existing 
between the communicating IoT devices, smart phones used for user’s interaction and target servers can be 
exploited. Data transmitted in plain text can be intercepted while encrypted data can also be decrypted using 
suitable algorithm to decipher coded data and reveal sensitive information. Data security and privacy of IoT 
remains a major challenge and will be the main focus in the foreseeable future. A survey on IoT security and 
device vulnerability discussed various security issues like intrusion detection, threat modeling and ever-evolving 
IoT vulnerabilities (Neshenko et al, 2019). The authors identified numerous security breaches, attacks which 
exploit vulnerabilities and corresponding remediation methodologies. One of such recent attacks is the Marai 
botnet which affected major internet platforms and cloud services. The distributed denial-of-service attack 
primarily target devices like IP cameras and home routers. Devices connected to such compromised routing 
devices can easily be exposed to malicious software or malware which will further propagate the devasting effect 
of the implemented attack. 
In this research work, we developed an IoT system using Raspberry Pi, sensors and Message Queuing 
Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol for publish-subscribe communication. We utilized three Raspberry Pi 
devices that communicate and transmit data via MQTT during interaction with the sensors. We further discuss 
active and passive attacks which can be used to compromise the security of the IoT system. Furthermore, we also 
discuss ways through which any abnormality in the normal behavior or trends of sensors data can be detected.  
 
2. Related Work 
Several works have studied the security issues in IoT and discussed possible solutions. One of such works (Hameed 
& Alomary 2019) was presented in a survey which reviewed relevant algorithms that can be used to secure IoT 
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networks. The authors discussed authentication methods and hardware security support for IoT. A broad overview 
of the security risks in IoT and possible counteractions was also discussed in a recent survey (Meneghello et al 
2019). Specific security mechanisms adopted by most popular IoT communication protocols was presented and 
the authors analyzed some of the attacks against IoT devices. Safety necessities like secrecy, unity and 
substantiation for IoT was presented in another research work (Gurunath et al 2018). IoT threat analysis involving 
twelve kind of different attacks, use of botnet, security issues in IoT networks and power consumption issues were 
also discussed. 
An IoT security model that can be used by organization to plan a strategy and discourse about IoT security 
from end-to-end perspective was presented in a recent conference on pervasive computing and communications 
(Bugeja et al 2019). The authors proposed a conceptual framework that can be used to analyze, describe and 
measure overall security level of an IoT ecosystem. Concepts like security-by-design processes and standards, 
continuous and automated risk assessment, data and application threat modeling, security testing, continuous 
monitoring, and auditing were discussed in relation to an organization’s security practices. A methodology for the 
development of a consumer security index (CSI) to aid consumer decision making and encourage greater security 
provision in the manufacture of IoT devices was suggested in a research work (Blythe et al 2018). The authors 
employed an online survey to identify consumer preferences and identified security features that consumer IoT 
devices should provide. They also developed a matrix of different classes of IoT devices and explored the use of 
natural language processing to extract data from device user manuals to identify security features provided by 
manufacturers. In one of our earlier works (Olumide & Tosun 2019), we explored the data being transmitted by 
six representative IoT devices and analyzed the data using a proxy server to capture both Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP) and Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) traffic. Sensitive information like user’s 
information and IP addresses were identified in our data analysis. We suggested that IoT devices should not allow 
proxy connections and developed a machine learning algorithm to detect proxies using network connection 
information.  
The need for a systematic and automated methodology that enables scalable testing approaches for security 
aspects in IoT ecosystem was discussed in a research paper on a project work that aimed to give scientists the 
ability to assess and compare different IoT security technologies (García et al 2018). The authors proposed a test-
based risk assessment and security certification for IoT. A middleware architecture which provides an end-to-end 
security solution for contributors who upload sensing data was suggested in another recent work (Garg & Dave 
2019). The proposed approach allows an end to end encryption of data to secure information in transit. The authors 
utilize a Representational State Transfer (REST) application programming interface (API) to communicate and 
exchange data. This provided an interface for user to register their IoT devices and securely access data collected 
by the device. During the process of collecting IoT information, the type and timing of the shared information so 
as to ensure confidentiality of the shared information and establish the rating of information sharing has also been 
addressed (Choi et al 2018). The authors discussed a functional requirement in the IoT information security sharing 
system and established functions to be performed between individuals in the reference model of the IoT 
information security sharing system. Security concerns like device cloning, sensitive data exposure, data tampering, 
denial of service, unauthorized device access and control were also discussed in (Naik & Maral 2017). However, 
the authors only focused on ways to mitigate IoT security challenges pertaining to device cloning and sensitive 
data exposure. 
 
3. Security Vulnerabilities in IoT 
3.1. IoT System Design 
In this work, we first developed an IoT system that monitors weather attributes so that users can decide if any extra 
time is needed for their commute. The system uses real-time processing of a combination of imagery and sensor 
data to fully describe the weather condition to the users. The users can then access all of this data via a MQTT app 
on their smartphone.   
The weather sensor client Pi’s purpose is to collect real-time weather data and transmit via MQTT to the 
broker Pi for further processing. The five different sensors on this Pi are a digital temperature sensor, digital 
humidity sensor, analog smoke detector, analog combustible gas detector, and analog CO detector. The digital 
sensors connect directly to the General-Purpose Input/Output (GPIO) pins of the Raspberry Pi while the analog 
sensors connect to an Analog to Digital (A2D) converter which then connects to the Raspberry Pi. The A2D 
converter is required since all of the GPIO pins on the Raspberry Pi are digital pins. The Pi will read the sensors 
and determine if the thresholds for the analog sensors has been exceeded. The Pi will then configure this 
information into a predetermined JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format and transmit this JSON over MQTT 
to the broker Pi with the topic “iot/sensor_data” for further processing. This whole process will happen every 10 
seconds. 
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Fig. 1: IoT system architecture 
The camera client Pi as shown in figure 1 serves the purpose of image capturing and its analysis. It is used 
for visual confirmation of the atmospheric disposition of the area where the sensors are utilized for monitoring 
purposes. Using our python script, we automate image capturing via the Pi camera every 10 seconds and use the 
Google cloud platform for the image analysis. The cloud assisted method via the Google cloud platform helps in 
object identification in captured images using machine learning techniques. This helps in our evaluation of the 
current disposition of the atmospheric condition visually.  
 
Fig 2: Phone MQTT message 
The broker Pi’s purpose is to collect the data that is being published from the weather sensor Pi with the topic 
“iot/sensor_data” and the camera sensor Pi with the topic “iot/camera_data” and make it where the user can gain 
access to this data via MQTT. When the user sends the word “data” to the topic “iot/get_command” the broker Pi 
will then send the data back to the phone via MQTT with the topic “iot/phone_message.” as shown in figure 2. 
 
3.2. Cyber Flaws Identification and Exploitation 
Here, the purpose is to discover and then exploit vulnerabilities that will allow an adversary to alter any data that 
the system collects and sends. Also, a machine learning technique will be utilized to identify if any of the sensor 
data has been tampered with or modified. 
Eavesdropping on the Broker Pi 
Once an adversary has access to the network, they could use Wireshark to start collecting information about any 
devices on the network, especially the IoT devices. Here, Wireshark was installed directly on the broker IoT device 
itself so the client sensor data, client camera data, and user interaction with the client could be monitored.  
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Fig 3: Sensor client MQTT transmission 
A filter was applied to the incoming data so only the MQTT messages could be observed as shown in figure 
3. The MQTT messages that were observed include the broker Pi ping request to the online MQTT server, the data 
being sent from the camera client to the gateway Pi, the sensor data being sent from the sensor client Pi to the 
gateway Pi, and the user request from the MQTT client to the gateway Pi. There is so much useful information 
that an adversary can collect from just this one MQTT message. The available information that will be exposed 
include IP address of client Pi, IP address of broker Pi, port number MQTT message is sent through, MQTT topic 
and client Pi data.  
The figure 4 shows the data gathered about the user’s request acquired through eavesdropping. The advantage 
of using an online broker instead of installing the broker on the Raspberry Pi itself is that the user’s IP address is 
not given in the transaction, thus protecting the privacy of the user. All of the information collected will later be 
used to find other vulnerabilities and launch attacks.  
 
Fig 4: User client transmission information 
Vulnerability 1:  Default Password/Configuration of Raspberry Pi 
First, Network Mapper (Nmap) scan of the of the IP address was implemented to see the version of the network 
processors and thus determine what vulnerabilities are in existence. Once the data has been received, a Nessus 
vulnerability scan was implemented to see what kind of exploits can be used on the system. Specifically, the 
vulnerability that was searched for entails using the default username and password to access the system when the 
Secure Shell (SSH) port is open. Using a tool named Metasploit on the Kali Linux operating system, Nmap scan 
was executed on both the client and gateway Pi to search for vulnerabilities. Using the command: nmap -sV -O 
192.168.11.212, on the client Pi and nmap -sV -O 192.168.11.241 on the 
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Fig 5: Nmap Scan of Broker Pi 192.168.11.241 
gateway Pi. The port was not open on the client Pi but it was open on the broker Pi as shown in figure 5. The first 
vulnerability that was discovered in the system was a default username and password that is used for the SSH login 
from a computer to a Raspberry Pi was still active. To exploit this vulnerability, the adversary has to be in the 
same internal network as the system that was intended to be exploited. If the adversary was on an external network, 
the remote SSH login could not be achieved. The issue with this vulnerability is that once the hackers connects 
with the SSH login, they have full access to the system and have the potential to alter any data, software, or setting 
of the IoT devices. In our experiment, using the default username: pi and default password: raspberry, we gained 
access to the system.  
 
Vulnerability 2: Unencrypted MQTT Messages 
Another vulnerability of the system that was discovered is the transmission of unencrypted MQTT messages 
between the IoT devices. An adversary can easily interpret the MQTT message payload. One attack that was done 
was to create a compromised IOT sensor client to send incorrect data to the gateway. This would be easy for the 
adversary to create since they could view the data structure that the sensory information is send and recreate it 
with incorrect information. To exploit this vulnerability, MQTT messages were sent using another Raspberry Pi 
with incorrect temperature values, such as the temperature being 5 degrees instead of 74 degrees, in the required 
JSON format to the gateway Pi with the topic “iot/sensor_data” will give the user inaccurate data. This type of 
attack represented an adversary gaining access to the network and creating adding a compromised client into the 
system with the purpose to give the user incorrect data.  
In addition to the false data being sent, a DOS attack could be launched to not allow the correct data to be 
introduced to the system making it where only the incorrect data will be viewed. To replicate this type of attack, 
the additional Raspberry Pi was programmed to send the incorrect data in the required JSON format continuously 
to the gateway Pi with the topic “iot/sensor_data”. This accomplished the task where the actual sensor data was 
never received by the gateway Pi. Even if it was received, it would be replaced by the incorrect data instantaneously.  
 
Vulnerability 3: Physical Attack 
Assuming that the adversary has access to the system they could launch a physical attack on the system. As shown 
in figure 6, all of the electrical components on the breadboard are connected to a 3.3 Volt Power source.  
 
Fig 6: Vulnerable Physical System 
One method a physical attack could be implemented is that the analog sensors could be disconnected from 
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the 3.3 Volt source and connect them to the 5 Volt source on the Raspberry Pi while still leaving the A2D converter 
connected to the 3.3 Volt source. The output data from the sensors as shown in figure 7, will give higher reading 
than the average, making the sensor reading inaccurate. 
 
                                                     
Fig 7a: Correct 3.3 Volt CO2 Sensor Measurement   Fig 7b: 5.5 Volt Inflated CO2 Sensor Measurement 
Another way a physical attack could be implemented involves wiring the analog input of the A2D converter 
directly to the 3.3 Volt power supply. This will result in a situation where the sensor would always give a false 
detection of CO2 gas. Arguably, the most dangerous method a physical attack could be implemented entails 
connecting the analog input of the A2D converter directly to ground. This will make it unable to detect CO2 gas 
which could possibly harm user. All of these physical attacks would affect the reliability of the system. 
 
3.3. System Protection Measures 
As earlier identified, there are multiple vulnerabilities and attacks that can be implemented on the system. However, 
majority of these attacks can be prevented by adding protection measures and security mechanisms. Default 
Password 
This is actually the simplest solution to fix one of the vulnerabilities. This involves creating a new user and a 
unique password for that user. If the adversary wanted to gain access to the system, they will have to find the 
password through brute force or other password cracking techniques. Once this is done, an adversary cannot use 
the default username and password to access the system.  
SSH Login 
Another option to eliminate vulnerability is to turn off SSH login on the Pi or close the port all together. The SSH 
login ability was turned off once our experiments was completed so the adversary could not remote login to the 
system.  
Hardware Interference 
The hardware interference vulnerability can be solved by fabricating the circuit on a circuit board and enclosing 
the circuit in a case. This will increase the difficulty of creating hardware interference instead of just rewiring the 
circuit on the breadboard. A software prevention method would be to add a sensor which monitor the quality of 
transmitted data. The system will send an alert when the sensor data output is below a certain threshold, such as 
when the output of the sensor is grounded. The same will happen when the sensor data output is above the average 
by a certain threshold for a certain amount of time. For example, when the output of the sensor was wired high or 
5 volts is applied to the sensor instead of 3.3 Volt thus inflating the values.  
MQTT Interference 
One prominent way to secure MQTT messages that are transmitted in plain text is to utilize encryption. Once the 
data was converted into JSON block format on the sensor client Pi, the messages would be encrypted and then sent 
over MQTT to the gateway Pi. The gateway Pi will then decrypt the messages and store the sensor data. A simple 
and least computationally expensive encryption algorithm involves converting the ASCII text in the string to 
hexadecimal (hex). A keyword string is used to encrypt the messages. The number of characters is counted in that 
keyword string and this number is subtracted from every hex character in MQTT message, thus creating an 
encrypted message. When a message is received by the broker Pi, the characters are counted in the keyword string 
and the number is added to every hex character in the MQTT message thus decrypting the message. This approach 
accomplished the goal of making it difficult for adversary to view data in plain text and easily craft an attack.  
 
4. Real-time Anomaly Detection 
Towards an intelligent security mechanism, an intrusion detection method using neural network to determine 
whether the sensor’s state or data has been tampered with or altered was implemented. The features in the sensor 
data are Temperature, Humidity, Smoke detection, Combustible gas detection, CO detection, and Picture. Only 
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Temperature and Humidity, out of the six features have numerical values. Hence, the need to encode the non-
numeric values for the other four features into numeric values for machine learning computation. Since the values 
return by Smoke detection, Combustible gas detection and CO detection can either be “True” or “False”, we encode 
1 for “True” and -1 for “False”. Concerning Picture, it can either return “Clear” or “Smoky”. We encode -1 for 
“Clear” and 1 for “Smoky”. A typical vector representation of the sensor reading looks like [ 76, 56, -1, -1, -1, -1] 
which are [Temperature, Humidity, Smoke detection, Combustible gas detection, CO detection, and Picture]. 
Concerning the huge numeric values for Temperature and Humidity which may outwit the other encoded values, 
we need to scale down the values so as to be in a range close to the encoded values. We performed feature scaling 
to reduce the huge numbers to values within the range 0 and 1, using the formula x = (x - xmin) / (xmax - xmin). 
The output based on the sensor’s data can either be “Good” encoded with 0 or “Danger” encoded with 1. Using 
various possible combination, we formulate the training data. For example, a sample of the training data will look 
like [0.72, 0.58, -1, -1, -1, -1, 0], where the first six values will be for the xtrain data and last value i.e. 0 will be 
for the ytrain. We utilized the Multilayer Perceptron neural network (MLP) classifier for our machine learning 
work. In the machine learning classifier module, we subscribe to the MQTT topics that the sensor’s reading was 
published to by the broker. Every new reading generated by the sensors serves as an instance of xtest that we use 
the MLP classifier for the detection of abnormality at any point in time. 
However, it was noticed that the MLP classifier often misclassified largely due to overfitting and insufficient 
training data. We only had five sensors and we formulate our training data using different possible combination of 
sensor data reading scenario. Thus, we changed to decision tree which is a supervised learning method used for 
classification and regression. We used it to create a model that can classify any real-time sensor input data by 
learning simple decision rules inferred from our training data. Schematically, the decision tree can be illustrated 
showing all the decision rule that was implemented in the model. As shown in figure 8, we use a subset of the 
features to evaluate the safety condition in a smart home environment. During the  
 
Fig 8: Decision tree model representation 
 
Fig 9: Decision tree output results 
training phase, we trained the model using a dataset containing different possible values for the sensors. For every 
MQTT message that was published, we classify it in real-time to detect if there is a problem or if it is in good 
condition. As shown in figure 9, the classification outputs show the effectiveness of our approach. 
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Security is a major concern in IoT that needs to be addressed by all IoT device manufacturers and users. This study 
explored and investigated flaws inherent in an IoT system that was developed using Raspberry Pi, sensors and 
MQTT protocol for communication. Vulnerabilities were found in the system and active as well as passive attacks 
were executed to comprise the security of the IoT system. After discovering multiple vulnerabilities within the 
system and exploiting these vulnerabilities, protection measures were implemented to ensure data privacy and 
security of the system. Additionally, a real-time anomaly detection in streaming environmental sensor data was 
also developed to alert user of dangerous conditions so that appropriate measures can be taken for safety of lives 
and properties.  
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